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METHODS OF REMOVING RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS IN ILLINOIS
The term "covenant" is usually used to indicate an agreement to do or
not to do a particular act.' The common usage, however, is principally in
connection with agreements concerning the transfer of real property. Restrictive covenants refer to agreements in deeds and other instruments which
limit and qualify the full enjoyment of real property. 2 These covenants
usually take on a negative character, that is, the grantee and his heirs are
forbidden from performing certain acts in relation to the land.3 There are,
however, restrictive covenants that take the form of an affirmative duty to
perform some service to the land. 4
Restrictive covenants are commonly created in the deed that conveys
the property, 5 but they have also been created by oral agreement. 6 The
courts, however, express a divergence of opinion when confronted with the
validity of these oral agreements. The general rule, Illinois included, is
that these oral agreements are in fact contracts for the sale of real property
and are governed by provisions of the Statute of Frauds. 7 In an Illinois case,
Tinker v. Forbes,8 Tinker, the owner of the west half of a lot, sought an
injunction to prohibit Forbes, the owner of the east half, from erecting a
building on the land. Tinker alleged that the Rockford Water Power Company, the common source of title of the opposing parties, had orally represented to him at the time of the conveyance that the east half of the lot
would forever be free of buildings so as not to disturb their enjoyment of
light and air. The court held the restriction invalid, and stated that oral
representations are not sufficient to create the servitude on the land. As the
servitude is an interest in land, the Statute of Frauds requires a writing.
Co-tenancy may also be implied from the circumstances, as when there
I Leverich v. Roy, 402 Ill. 71, 83 N.E.2d 335 (1948).
2 For a comprehensive discussion of these covenants see Clark, Covenants and Interests Running With the Land (2d ed. 1947); 3 Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed. 1939);
Friedman, Contracts and Conveyances of Real Property (2d ed. 1963). Among the restrictions which limit the enjoyment of real property are: those which restrict the right of a
party to engage in business in competition with another; restrictions against the sale of
intoxicating liquor on the premises; building restrictions which prohibit erection of
particular structures, such as, billboards, fences, signs, other than single dwelling houses,
balconies, pavilions, porches and patios; restrictions excluding birds and animals or if
allowed, where they may be maintained; restrictions on how dose to the street the
house may be built; and restrictions as to valuations, height and number of buildings
allowed on the land.
3 Natural Products Co. v. Dolese & Shepard Co., 309 I1l. 230, 140 N.E. 840 (1923).
4 Hutchinson v. Ulrich, 145 Ill. 336, 34 N.E. 556 (1893); Wise v. Woutens, 288 Ill. 29,
123 N.E. 35 (1919). The service to be performed is usually one that relates to prohibition
of waste or the duty to maintain certain structures, such as fences, gates, wells, dams, in a
reasonable condition.
5 Bowes v. Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 175, 120 N.E.2d 15 (1954).
6 Thorton v. Schobe, 79 Colo. 25, 243 Pac. 617 (1926); Hall v. Solomon, 61 Conn.
476, 23 At. 876 (1892).
7 IUI. Rev. Stat. ch. 59, § 2 (1967).
8 136 Ill. 221, 26 N.E. 503 (1891); See Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 1318 (1949).
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is an establishment of a permanent building scheme, 9 and also from plats
and maps. 10
A restrictive covenant is usually enforceable only by the person for
whom the benefit was intended. 1 This person generally has an interest in
some land that is benefited by this restriction. Most jurisdictions hold that
when a person no longer holds land that can be benefited by the covenant,
he ceases to be entitled to enforce it.12
Illinois, however, is in the minority and allows a person to enforce a
restrictive covenant even though he owns no other property in the vicinity.
In Van Sant v. Rose,'5 the owners of land conveyed it by a deed which contained covenants prohibiting any building within thirty feet of the street
line by the grantee. The grantee conveyed to his wife and other defendants
who were about to build an apartment house in disregard of the covenant.
The court held that the right to enjoin a breach of restrictive covenants
does not depend on whether the grantor will be damaged by the breach;
the mere breach is itself sufficient ground for interference by injunction.
Whether other persons are entitled to enforce the covenant depends on
the intention of the parties who imposed it. Thus, other owners of property
in the neighborhood may also benefit by the covenant, as will subsequent
grantees and their heirs.
Many owners of land in imposing these restrictive covenants did so at
a time when their future implications could not be foreseen. Today many
of these covenants have become outmoded and obsolete. As these covenants
must be considered enforceable until removed by legal process, they present
a serious impediment to any real estate transaction. Future buyers are unwilling to purchase property if their use of it is hindered and restricted. A
lawyer, if successful in removing the onus of these covenants from land, can
increase its value manifold. Following is a discussion of the different approaches to removing a restrictive covenant, with an assessment of their
various strengths and weaknesses.
RELEASE

One of the primary methods of removing a covenant is a written release, or a new covenant operating as a release or a modification of the
9 Starmount Co. v. Greensboro Memorial Park, Inc., 233 N.C. 613, 65 S.E.2d 134,
(1951); Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 898 (1952).
10 As to the effect of covenants contained in the sale of lots with reference to a map or
plat showing streets and right of ways, see 23 Am. Jur. 2d Dedication § 25 (1965); 2
Tiffany, Real Property § 400 (3d 1939).
11 Henricks v. Bowles, 20 Ill. App. 2d 148, 155 N.E.2d 664 (1st Dist. 1959); Palermo v.
Allen, 91 Ariz. 57, 369 P.2d 906 (1962); Johnson v. Guarino, 22 Conn. 257, 168 A.2d 171
(1960).
12 Kent v. Koch, 166 Cal. App. 2d 579, 333 P.2d 411 (1958); Rupel v. General Motors
Corp., 120 Ohio 152, 201 N.E.2d 355 (1963); Restatement, Property § 549, 550 (1936).
13 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913). Accord, Club Manor Inc. v. Oheb Shalom Congregation, 211 Md. 465, 128 A.2d 405 (1957).
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original, executed by those who are entitled to enforce it. This method
would be governed by the law of contracts and all the indicia of a valid
contract would be required. Any breach of this contract could be remedied
by a suit for damages or preferably by a suit in equity praying for specific
performance.
The grantor of the release, however, does not have the power to release
the grantee from the effect of covenants which appeared earlier in the chain
of title. In Raclin v. Village of Winnetka,14 the present property owners
sought a writ of mandamus to compel issuance of building permits which
allowed two residences upon the property. By the terms of their deed from
Henriksen the property was subject to certain covenants contained in an
earlier deed from Mahen to Zimmer. Later, Henriksen gave a release as to
these earlier covenants. The court held that the release by Henriksen
amounted to no more than an agreement on his part that he would not
prosecute an injunction. Obviously he could not release the covenants of
an earlier deed, as such covenants were binding upon him and one cannot
release his own obligations. Accordingly, the court denied the writ.
A release is not often easily acquired. Many times the benefiting party,
for reasons of his own, will not release the covenant. Often when he is
willing to release it, the price necessary to procure it is too expensive to be
worthwhile. If the number of benefiting parties is excessive, as in the case
where a restriction is uniformly imposed on all the plats in a tract of land,
the expense would be too great. Each individual holder of land within the
tract would have to accede to the release since each is benefited by the
covenant. The circumstances necessary to make a release advantageous are
where the benefit is conferred on only one person and the use to him is such
that it can easily be acquired.
MERGER OF ESTATES

The merger of the benefited and the bound estates is another approach
to removing a restriction. The fact situation usually present in such a case
is where a number of lots were sold subject to certain building restrictions
pursuant to a general scheme or plan, or one where an owner of two or more
estates sells one and imposes upon it a restriction for the benefit of the
remaining property.
In a New Jersey case, 15 the owner of four adjoining lots conveyed
three of them to a grantee subject to a restriction that only residential
buildings could be constructed on the land. The benefit of this restriction
was conferred in favor of the owner of the fourth lot. Through a series of
conveyances, title to the four lots were all merged in a common owner, who
desired to build a commercial structure. The court held the restriction was
14 369 ill. 532, 17 N.E.2d 324 (1938).
15 Olson v. Jantausch, 44 N.J. Super., 380, 130 A.2d 650 (App. Div. 1957).
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terminated and unenforceable since "the benefit and the burden coming
into the hands of one person the obligation is extinguished."'u
Illinois follows the general rule, which is that a covenant in a deed of
land which restricts its use, and is inserted for the benefit of other land, will
be extinguished by the vesting of the title to both tracts of land in one person. The only case contra is Wiegman v. Kusel,17 which can be distinguished
on the facts. The grantor conveyed a number of lots out of a certain tract
which was bound by restrictions for the benefit of the remainder of the
tract. At the time of the grantor's repurchase of the bound lots, some lots
in the original tract were owned by other parties. Effective merger had not
taken place since all the restricted and benefited property must be in the
hands of a common owner at one time. Herein, the land was still bound by
the restrictions as the land was in the hands of different parties and not a
common owner.
The disadvantages of using such a method are apparent. The remaining
property may be unobtainable for diverse reasons. In other cases, the cost of
purchasing all of the land necessary to effectuate a merger may be prohibitive. Thus, in a minority of situations will such a method be used.
The above two methods-release and merger-were based on the contractual method of terminating the covenant, that is, an agreement by the
parties to end the obligation of the covenant evidenced by a written contract. Following are methods that are more in the nature of a defense to
the enforcement of restrictive covenants.
ACQUIESCENCE OF A BREACH OF COVENANT

The first of these defenses is to show that violations of the covenants
have been previously acquiesced to by the parties entitled to the benefit.
The factual situation necessary for acquiescence to occur is when violations
have been allowed certain owners and now the parties seek to enforce the
covenant against a new violator. The law is settled that even where a general plan is shown the restrictions under the plan will not be enforced
where there has been acquiescence to previous violations.' 8
In Wallace v. Hoffman,19 lot owners sought to enforce building line
restrictions against another owner. Many uses of the property inconsistent
with the restriction had been adopted over a twenty-year span. The court
held the restrictions unenforceable because the owners, by not complaining
of the previous clear-cut violations of the covenant, had acquiesced to them.
They could not now ask for the enforcement of the covenant, as its object,
the restricting of all building to a certain line, had long been defeated.
16 Id. at 385, 130 A.2d at 655.
17 270 Ill. 520, 110 N.E. 884 (1915).
18 McGovern v. Brown, 317 Ill.73, 147 N.E. 664 (1925); Curtis v. Rubin, 244 Ill. 88,

91 N.E. 84 (1910); Hoffman v. Schwan, 312 Ill.
App. 160, 38 N.E.2d 53 (1st Dist. 1941).
19 336 IlU. App. 545, 84 N.E.2d 654 (3d Dist. 1940).
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This defense can be compared with the doctrine of estoppel. The party
bringing the action once having acquiesced to the violations is now estopped
from complaining of new infractions.
ABANDONMENT

Another defense to enforcement of a restrictive covenant is the theory
of abandonment. It differs from acquiescence in that acquiescence refers to
submission to individual violations, while abandonment refers to the
yielding of the general scheme or plan. 20 Equity will not enjoin a breach
21
of a restriction where the original plan has been abandoned.
Abandonment of uniform restrictions on lots depends upon the existence of conduct by owners of benefited land which shows an intent to relinquish the benefit of the servitude. This intent is evinced by violation of
the covenants. The violations must not be sporadic or distant but must take
place over much of the restricted land. The breach must be a material and
substantial one. 22 Courts are not too inclined to declare that the benefit of
a restrictive covenant has been abandoned. In Shipley v. Oak Park Trust
& Savings Bank,23 the court held that slight variations from restrictions did
not constitute an abandonment of the general plan. The restrictions were
thus enforceable. In that case, there were variations in the minimum ground
floor area of the buildings in the subdivision. Curtisv. Rubin 24 is illustrative
of a situation where the court held an abandonment had taken place. The
plaintiffs, owners of land benefited by a covenant which established the
building line fifteen feet from the street, sued to enjoin the defendants
from violating it. The defendants had gone over this line by three or four
feet in various places. The defendants, in answering, admitted the existence
of the original plan but alleged that the plaintiffs had themselves violated
the restriction. The court held that if the plaintiffs had observed the line
themselves, equity would have protected their rights. Their disregard of the
building line demonstrated an intent to abandon the original plan and the
defendants should be allowed to violate the covenant to the same degree.
Abandonment would then only occur under the most severe circumstances. The violations of one seeking enforcement of a covenant must be
permanent and of such frequent occurrence as to indicate to the unjaundiced eye an intent to abandon. The courts, even though not favoring such
restrictions, viewing them as a detriment to the free alienation of real
property, will nevertheless enforce them if they are clear and unambiguous. 25
20 Curtis v. Rubin, 244 Ill. 88, 94 N.E. 84 (1910).
21 Ewertsen v. Gerstenberg, 186 I1. 344, 57 N.E. 1051 (1900).
22 Punzak v. Delano, 11 111. 2d 117, 142 N.E.2d 64 (1957).
23 30 Il. App. 2d 335, 174 N.E.2d 216 (2d Dist. 1961) (abstr.).
24 Supra note 20.
25 Hutchinson v., Ulrich, 145 M11.
336, 34 N.E. 556 (1893); Ecdhart v. Irons, 128 II. 568,
20 N.E. 687 (1889).
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LACHES

Since the validity of the covenants is decided in a court of equity,
equitable defenses will prevail to defeat the enforcement of them. The two
most prominent are laches and unclean hands. The doctrine of laches is
similar to acquiescence, in that the complaining party has acquiesced to
the violation for such an amount of time as to preclude him from relief.
Exactly what conduct on the plaintiff's part will amount to laches depends
on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. The plaintiff should
act promptly in asserting his rights; however, mere delay in bringing suit
does not in itself establish laches. 26 There must be some damage caused to
27
the defendant because of the delay.
In an Illinois case, Brandenburg v. Country Club Bldg. Corp.,2 8 the

defendant proceeded to build an apartment building in violation of a restrictive covenant covering the property. The plaintiff was aware of the
violation but did not complain of it until three months after the building
was completed, although the duration of construction was over a year. The
court held that the plaintiff's laches precluded the giving of any relief. The
court decided that the harm to the defendant in view of the plaintiff's delay
would be too great if the covenant were enforced. The plaintiff should have
complained within a reasonable time after he first had notice of the breach.
In contrast, if the plaintiff complained as soon as he was aware of the violations, the fact that the building was almost complete did not absolve the
defendant of the restriction, and the court held that laches had not been
established. 29 Similarly, when the purchaser of the property delays the plaintiffs in locating and protesting to the true owner-the party for whom the
property was purchased-laches will not lie. In Fick v. Burnham,30 restrictions were imposed on all the lots in a subdivision of Lincolnwood, Illinois.
They provided only one residence should be erected on each lot. When
Fick learned that an improvement was to take place she tried to contact
Burnham-the purchaser of the property. Tyson, the true owner could not
be found and when suit was filed the rate of construction increased on the
second building while construction on the main building stopped. The
court held laches had not been established and that the second building
must be removed.
UNCLEAN HANDS

The "clean hands" doctrine is similar to abandonment because the
complaining party must have committed some acts that are themselves violations of the covenant. In Kneip v. SchroederR1 owners of lots brought suit
28 Stewart v. Finkelstone, 206 Mass. 28, 92 N.E. 37 (1910).
27 Brandenburg v. Country Club Bldg. Corp., 332 I11. 136, 163 N.E. 440 (1928).
28
29
80
3'

Ibid.

Hartman v. Wells, 257 Ill. 167, 100 N.E. 500 (1912).
251 Ill. App. 333 (1st Dist. 1929).
255 Ili. 621, 99 N.E. 617 (1912).
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to enjoin the defendant from encroaching upon a building line. The owners
themselves had in the past been guilty of the same violations. The court
reasoned that the complaining parties, by their own violations, did not have
clean hands and a court of equity would not enforce the restrictions against
others.
This is the most practicable method for invalidating a covenant if a
breach by the complaining parties has occurred. The advantage of using
this method, as opposed to proving that the plaintiff has abandoned the
general plan, is obvious. In proving abandonment, one must show a series
of violations permanent in character which evince an intent to abandon the
plan; however, in pleading lack of clean hands one need show only a single
violation by the complaining party. This violation must be intentional and
of a serious nature since more than one negligent act may be needed to
sanction the defense of lack of clean hands.
EMINENT DOMAIN

A municipal or state government may, through its exercise of the
power of eminent domain, remove the restrictions from the land.3 2 The
government does not remove the restrictions per se, but their removal is
automatic as a result of the action. When the government acquires the land,
it is of necessity procured free of all burdens. The government, under the
fourteenth amendment, cannot take private property for public use without paying just compensation. Thus, if the government condemns property
for its own use, the holders of the benefits of the restrictions on that property must be compensated. These benefits are a property right that have
33
been taken.
ZONING LAWS

A state government may exercise its police power and legislate zoning
laws that clash with the restrictive covenants. The state's police power is
34
used to protect the health, safety or general welfare of the community. If
the covenant does not conflict with the purpose of the police power, the
state has no authority to resort to it to rid the property of the covenant. 35
Thus, in Dolan v. Brown, 36 the land was bound by covenants that restricted
its use to residential. The city council passed a zoning ordinance under
32 Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 57 Pac. 585 (1899).
33 Town of Stamford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 359, 143 At. 245 (1928); Peters v. Buckner
288 Mo. 618, 232 S.W. 1024 (1921). Contra, City of Houston v. Wynne, 279 S.W. 916 (Tex.
Civ. 1926). The arguments for both sides are discussed in 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain
§ 142 (1950); 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 575 (1950); 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain § 262
(1900); See also 3 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 258 (1956); 55 Mich. L. Rev. 877 (1957).
34 Palangio v. City of Chicago, 23 Ill. 2d 570, 179 N.E.2d 663 (1962); Village of La
Grange v. Leitch, 377 Ill. 99, 35 N.E.2d 346 (1941).
35 Finn v. Emmaus Evangelical Lutheran Church, 329 Ill. App. 343, 68 N.E.2d 541
(1st Dist. 1946) (abstr.).
86 338 Ill. 412, 170 N.E. 425 (1930).
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which the lot owned by Brown was classified for commercial uses. Brown
proceeded to erect a gas station and the plaintiff brought suit to enjoin him.
Brown contended that the enforcement of the ordinance could not be
enjoined. The court held that a valid restriction on the use of real property,
which in no way threatens or endangers the health, safety or general welfare
of the community, is neither nullified nor superseded by the adoption of a
zoning ordinance. However, if the purpose of the zoning law is to further
37
the scope of the restriction, then it will prevail.
Eminent domain and zoning laws, being procedures used exclusively by
governmental bodies, are not available to the private individual as a means of
38
removing restrictive covenants.
CHANGE IN THE CONDITION OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD

The most common defense given to prohibit enforcement of or terminate restrictive covenants is that the neighborhood has so changed that
there is no purpose in enforcing the covenants. It would seem that the
courts would give a liberal use to this defense as restrictions which interfere
with the free use of property are not favored in the law. 39 This, however, is
not the case since courts are very conservative in determining what actually
constitutes a sufficient change so as to bring about invalidation. There are
no precise rules for ascertaining when changed conditions exist, and each
case will have to be decided on its specific circumstances. In Ewertsen v.
Gerstenberg,40 the court stated the general proposition to be:
The general rule is that equity will not enforce a restriction where
the property and that in the vicinity has so changed in its character
and environment and in the uses to which it may be put, as to make
it unfit or unprofitable for use if the restriction be enforced; or
where to grant an injunction against violation of such restriction
would be a great hardship on the owner and of no benefit to the
complainant.
The fact that changes have taken place and that property from which
it is sought to remove restrictions would be more valuable without them
41
does not alone authorize equity to terminate restrictive covenants.
37 Bluett v. County of Cook, 19 Il. App. 2d 172, 153 N.E.2d 305 (1st Dist. 1958).
38 For an extensive discussion of the general problems involved when a zoning law
conflicts with a restrictive covenant see, Zoning Law & Practice, Yokely (1953); Bergen,
Conflicts between Zoning Ordinances and Restrictive Covenants: A Problem in Land
Use Policy, 43 Neb. L. Rev. 449 (1963); 2 Ruthkopf, Zoning & Planning, ch. 74 (3d ed.
1962); Van Hecke, Zoning Ordinances & Restrictions in Deeds, 37 Yale L.J. 407 (1928).
39 Staley v. Means, 13 Ill. App. 2d 451, 142 N.E.2d 835 (3d Dist. 1957); Wallace v.
Hoffman, 336 Ill. App. 545, 84 N.E.2d 654 (3d Dist. 1949).
40 O'Neill v. Wolf, 338 Ill. 508, 170 N.E. 669 (1930); Cuneo v. Chicago Title & Trust
Co., 337 111. 589, 169 N.E. 760 (1929).
41 186 Ill. 34, 346, 57 N.E. 1051, 1054 (1900). Accord, Mangini v. Oak Park Trust &
Savings Bank, 43 Ill. App. 2d 318, 193 N.E.2d 479 (2d Dist. 1963) (not enough alteration
in land use to show an adequate change); Star Brewery Co. v. Primas, 163 Ill. 652, 45
N.E. 145 (1896); McArthur v. Hood Rubber Co., 221 Mass. 372, 109 N.E. 162 (1915).
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In the case of Drexel State Bank of Chicago v. O'Donnell,42 the plaintiff bank brought suit to remove building restrictions on a certain lot. The
plaintiff pleaded that it would cause a financial hardship for the court to
enforce the single dwelling restrictions on this land. The evidence showed
that in the past three years single residence houses had been torn down on
the opposite side of the street and that apartment buildings had been built
in their place. The court held that while it might be a financial hardship,
the extent of the change was not substantial enough for the court to remove
the restrictions. "Where the restriction involved still remains of such substantial advantage to the property which it was created to protect the court
cannot undertake to wipe out the covenants."4 3 The court concluded that
the restrictions were set up for the adjoining property owners for easements
of light and air, and that the benefits were still apparent, even though the
change occurred, and the restrictions were still in force.
The mere fact that there have been some changes in the neighborhood is
not enough. In Burke v. Kleiman,44 five hundred white persons entered into
a restrictive agreement. The covenant contained therein provided against
leasing or selling of any premises included in the agreement to any person
of the colored race. Defendant leased an apartment to a Negro. The plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring that the defendants remove all persons
coming within the description of the restrictive covenants. The defendant
answered that since the agreement was signed conditions had so changed
that the granting of the injunction would be inequitable. Four apartments
had previously been rented in violation of the agreement. The court held
that this was not sufficient evidence to show a change of conditions and that
45
the restrictive agreements were still operative.
In Punzak v. De Lano,46 suit was brought to enjoin the defendants
from violating building line restrictions. At the time of the creation of the
covenants the character of the neighborhood was strictly residential. The
defendants argued that the restriction should not be enforced because the
character of the neighborhood had changed into one that was predominantly
commercial. The court, pointing out that the neighborhood was not originally limited to residential use, held the covenants valid. "The mere fact
that a change has occurred does not alone, warrant a court of equity in
47
relieving property of restrictions."
Thus, the courts have held that even though the neighborhood has
changed, this will not by itself terminate the restriction where 1) it appears
that the the covenant is still of substantial benefit to a dominant estate, as
344 Ill. 173, 176 N.E. 348 (1931).
Id. at 175, 176 N.E. at 350.
277 Ill. App. 519, transferred 355 Ill. 390, 189 N.E. 372 (1934).
Today these racial restrictions are prohibited under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836 (1948).
46 11 111. 2d 17, 142 N.E.2d 64 (1957).
47 Id. at 121, 142 N.E.2d at 66.
42
43
44
45
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in Drexel State Bank of Chicago v. O'Donnell;48 2) it appears that the
change has not been so thorough or extensive so as to defeat the purpose of
the covenant, as in Burke v. Kleiman;49 and 3) it appears that the change
does not conflict with the purpose of the covenant. 50
What then are considered changes worthy of removing these restrictions? Courts generally agree it is not the quality of the change, but what it
accomplishes that will be decisive, and when the object of the restriction
can no longer be achieved it will be negated. 51
Illinois courts will not enforce restrictive covenants under a theory of
a change in the neighborhood unless either of two elements is present. The
first is that there has been such a change in the character and environment of the property that the objective of the restrictions cannot be accomplished, 52 and second that the change causes their enforcement to be
oppressive and brings undue hardship on the party breaching. 53
In an Illinois case, Piper v. Reder,54 the original plat of the subdivision
established a thirty foot building restriction from every street line. The
plaintiff's and defendant's lots were separated by Balmoral Avenue. In 1962,
the village enacted an ordinance that in effect vacated the section of Balmoral Avenue between their lots. The defendant thereafter acquired title to
the property and built over the thirty foot line. The plaintiff then brought
suit to enjoin the violation and the court dismissed the action. There had
been a marked change in the condition of the property. As Balmoral Avenue
was vacated, the defendants claimed that the thirty foot restriction was terminated. The court reasoned that building line restrictions are commonly
established adjacent to a street to provide easements of light and air for it.
Since the street had been vacated, there was no reason for the easements to
exist. Therefore, since the purpose had dissolved the restriction should cease.
In another case, Ewersten v. Gerstenberg,55 the court again refused to
enforce a building line restriction. The purpose of the line was to promote
a uniform row of houses. The line had been disregarded by a number of the
other lot owners in the neighborhood in previous instances. The court held
that the conditions had so changed that the object of the restriction could
Supra note 42.
Supra note 44.
50 Supra note 46. See, Paschen v. Pashkov, 63 Ill. App. 2d 56, 211 N.E.2d 576 (1st Dist.
1965), where it has been held that construction of a school at one end of the area did not
constitute a change of conditions that would warrant the removal of single family restrictive covenants in deeds, but could be regarded as a buffer zone between the residential
area and the area across from the school.
51 Marra v. Aetna Const. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940); Thodos v. Shirk,
248 Iowa 172, 79 N.W.2d 733 (1956); Price v. Anderson, 358 Pa. 209, 56 A.2d 215 (1948).
52 Mangini v. Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank, 43 Ill. App. 2d 318, 193 N.E.2d 479
(1963).
53 Piper v. Reder, 44 Ill. App. 2d 431, 195 N.E.2d 224 (lst Dist. 1963).
54 Ibid.
56 186 Ill. 344, 57 N.E. 1051 (1900).
48

49
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no longer be accomplished and that it would thus be unjust to require the
defendants to abide by them.
Where a covenant restricted all structures in the neighborhood to a
residential character, and apartment and commercial buildings had been
erected, the court held a sufficient change had taken place 56 to terminate
the covenants. The purpose of the covenant was obviously gone and an
undue hardship would occur if it were enforced.
Thus, in Illinois, restrictive covenants will not be enforced where the
change is such that it is no longer possible to accomplish the original intention of the restriction, or where the enforcement would be unreasonable and
oppressive, in that it would impose an undue hardship on the parties bound
by the restrictions.
ALADAR F. SILES
56 Gilmore v. Keough, 241 Iil. App. 28 (Ist Dist. 1926); Accord, Kneip v. Schroeder,
255 Ill. 621, 99 N.E. 617 (1912), where there had not only been extensions over the building
line but an elevated raliroad had been erected through the block.

